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Abstract: The Middle East conflict has remained one of the core issues of contemporary international
relations since World War II. One of the most important matters is to define whether the Middle East
peace process is related to the Middle East conflict or, more precisely, to the Arab-Israeli conflict. With
respect to land, there are two possible scenarios. Firstly, Palestinians living under Israeli administration.
Secondly, a two-state solution, namely an official recognition of the state of Israel by all Arab states and
the foundation of a Palestinian state. So far, there have been dozens of peace plans, for example, the Oslo
Peace Process, the Taba talks of 2001, the Road Map of 2003, and the Annapolis Conference of 2007.
None of them resulted in a comprehensive solution. The question is, if the international community will
face another stalemate in case of the Middle East peace process. Might the so-called Arab awakening,
namely all the ongoing political and social processes in the Arab states, change the situation in the re-
gion?
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Introduction
T
he Middle East conflict has remained one of the core issues of contemporary
international relations since World War II. Some scholars seek its roots in the
foundation of Zionism in the 21st century or in the Balfour Declaration of 1917
(Balfour, 2011, pp. 107–112). Others claim that the problem appeared when Israel
was declared an independent state in 1948. Whatever and whenever the cause, rela-
tions between Palestinians and Israelis directly affect the political situation in the
Middle East and indirectly affect the worldwide political situation.
One of the most important matters is to define whether the Middle East peace process
is related to the Middle East conflict or, more precisely, to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In
general, it is an international conflict between Israel and Arab states, especially those lo-
cated close to Israel, like Lebanon or Syria, but this term is also used to describe the con-
flict between Israelis and Palestinians.
According to Joseph S. Nye “the Arab-Israeli conflict has produced six wars between
two groups of people asserting different national identities, but claiming the same post-
age-stamp-size piece of land” (Nye, 2007, p. 189). With respect to the land, there are two
possible scenarios. Firstly, of Palestinians living under Israeli administration. There are
already many Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. Yet even in their case, there are many
daily problems. They claim they are not treated in a just manner by Jews. Ilan Peleg and
Dov Waxman claim that “the conflation of Israeli with Jew is constantly repeated in the
media and by politicians and activists, pro-Israel and anti-Israel alike” (Peleg, Waxman,
2011, p. 19). As a result, Israel’s Palestinians do not exist in public opinion worldwide.
Secondly, a two-state solution, namely an official recognition of the state of Israel by all
Arab states and foundation of a Palestinian state (Witkin, 2011, pp. 47–48). The United
Nations General Assembly has supported a two-state solution since 1947. In resolution
181 of 29 November, 1947 the Assembly also suggested establishment of a Special Inter-
national Regime for the City of Jerusalem (Resolution 181). Yet both sides of the conflict
had other visions for the future of Palestine, which resulted in political instability, re-
gional terrorism, displacement of millions of Palestinians and military clashes.
Between 1948–2011 there were six wars between Israel and Arab states, namely in
1948–1949, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 2006 (Hirst, 2010; Khalidi, 2009; Morris, 2009;
Rabinovich, 2005; Segev, 2007; Varble, 2003). Arab states that have fought against Israel
so far are Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, Pales-
tinians remain the main opponents of Israelis.
In the opinion of Alan Dershowitz, “there seems to be more agreement among Pales-
tinian and Israeli negotiators about what a final resolution will look like than about the
steps that must be taken to get to that point. An absence of trust – the result of years of
missteps, missed opportunities, and domestic posturing – has created a chicken egg prob-
lem: each side wants the other side to show good faith before it is prepared to give up too
many chips without getting at least an equal number from the other side, lest it lose credi-
bility among skeptical members of its own constituencies” (Dershowitz, 2005, p. 12). Is
this still true? It seems that both sides have realised that a two-state solution could be mu-
tually beneficial. Palestinians would have their own state and would enjoy a freer hand in
international relations (Nusseibeh, 2011). At the same time, Israel would guarantee secu-
rity to its citizens. Yet at the moment, any such compromise seems unachievable. The
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not only about land or territorial supremacy. The main dif-
ferences between the two sides are related to:
— territorial claims, especially the city of Jerusalem and Israeli settlements on theWest
Bank;
— attitudes towards the foundation of the Palestinian state;
— Arab refusal to accept Jewish self-determination with the exception of Egypt and
Jordan;
— the economic gap between Palestinians and Israelis;
— ethnic differences, namely Israelis versus Arabs;
— religious differences, namely Jews versus Muslims.
So far there have been dozens of peace plans, for example, the Oslo Peace Process, the
Taba talks of 2001, the RoadMap of 2003, and the Annapolis Conference of 2007.1 A few
times there were indications of a comprehensive and lasting solution (Ross, 2005). The
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European Union has also engaged in the process, in the new format called ‘the Middle
East Quartet’. The Quartet consists of four entities: the EU, the UN, the United States and
Russia (Tocci, 2013, p. 29). Nevertheless, none of those proposals was successful and
none of them resulted in a mutually advantageous action plan. In the opinion of Mahdi
Abdul Hadi, “also the international community had proven unable to bring about a settle-
ment consistent with international law and UN resolutions, an increasing number of
voices claim that the two-state solution – a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel, as
pursued in various forms over the last five decades – had been effectively pre-empted by
the deliberate policies and strategies of recent Israeli governments” (Hadi, 2005, p. 1).
The question is if the international community will face another stalemate in case of
theMiddle East peace process. Might the so-called Arab awakening, namely all the ongo-
ing political and social processes in the Arab states, change the situation in the region?
Israel and Arabs: from Israel’s Disengagement Plan to the 2009
Israeli Operation in Gaza
The first full-scale crisis between Arabs and Israelis in the 21st century took place in
2006, when Israel attacked Hezbollah positions in South Lebanon and bombed several
cities, including Beirut.2 The attack was the Israeli response to rocket attacks from Leba-
nese territory and the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers.3 As regards its results, the war
seriously damaged Israel’s image, not only in the Middle East, but also worldwide. The
main reason for this was the high number of civilians killed in Lebanon (Lebanon, 2006).
Also, the general impression in the Arab world was that Hezbollah had won the war. As
amatter of fact Israel was defeated for the first time, although the Israelis did not intend to
admit the defeat officially (Mackey, 2008).
The summit in Annapolis of 2007 brought hope to both Israelis and Palestinians. This
conference in the United States was organised by the George Bush administration. Dur-
ing his speech, the President of the Palestinian National Authority,MahmoudAbbas, pre-
sented the Palestinian position. He declared that the Palestinian side would support an
agreement with Israel if certain requirements were met. Abbas stated that in order “to
achieve this does not depend on the Arab and Islamic position by itself, but requires meet-
ing this position by a reciprocal strategic willingness that would basically lead to ending
the occupation of all Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, as
well as the Syrian Golan Heights and what remains of occupied Lebanese territories, and
to resolve all other issues related to the conflict, especially the Palestinian refugees ques-
tion, in all its political, humanitarian, individual and common aspects, consistent with
Resolution 194, as emphasized by the Arab peace initiative and the participation of sister
states that host refugees and carry huge burdens in this regard” (President, 2007). Israel’s,
Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, affirmed that his government would do its best to reach
a comprehensive and lasting agreement: “We will address all the issues which have thus
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2 It is called the 2006 Lebanon War or the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.
3 One of them was Gilad Shalit who was later exchanged for over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners on
18 October, 2011.
far been evaded. We will do it directly, openly and courageously. We will not avoid any
subject, we will deal with all the core issues. I have no doubt that the reality created in our
region in 1967 will change significantly. While this will be an extremely difficult process
for many of us, it is nevertheless inevitable. I know it. Many of my people know it.We are
ready for it. The negotiations will be based on previous agreements between us, UN Secu-
rity Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Roadmap and the April 14th 2004 letter of Pres-
ident Bush to the Prime Minister of Israel. On conclusion of the negotiations, I believe
that we will be able to reach an agreement which will fulfill the vision of President Bush:
two states for two peoples. A peace-seeking, viable, strong, democratic and terror-free
Palestinian state for the Palestinian people. A Jewish, democratic State of Israel, living in
security and free from the threat of terror – the national home of the Jewish people” (Ad-
dress, 2007). Now, four years after the Annapolis conference, the question is what hap-
pened to the spirit of Annapolis and why the brave political declarations have remained
only declarations.
The political shift in Israel in 2009 did not help to foster the peace dialogue. The
comeback of BenjaminNetanyahu after the 2009 elections was bad news for Palestinians,
as the Likud leader was generally perceived as a hard-liner. It was also bad news for all
moderate Israelis. Ruth Dayan, the widow of legendary chief of staff of the Israeli De-
fense Forces, Moshe Dayan, criticised the present government publicly, saying: “For
Netanyahu, peace is just a word… and I call that foreign minister Liberman ‘Dober-
man’: how can a man like that represent our country? The way he speaks about our
Arabs, our Israeli Arabs, is unacceptable!” (Jebreal, 2011). Yet it was not Benjamin
Netanyahu who was responsible for the war in the Gaza Strip at the very beginning of
2009. Undoubtedly, this event crushed Palestinian and Israeli hopes for peace, at least
in the short run.
The Israeli operation in Gaza between 28 December, 2008–18 January, 2009, known
as Operation Cast Lead, became a turning point in the history of bilateral relations be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians. Moreover, it fuelled resentment towards Israel among
Muslims, and in theWest. Yet according to the Israeli authorities, “Israel had both a right
and an obligation to take military action against Hamas in Gaza to stop Hamas’ almost in-
cessant rocket and mortar attacks upon thousands of Israeli civilians and its other acts of
terrorism. Israel was bombarded by some 12,000 rockets and mortar shells between 2000
and 2008, including nearly 3,000 rockets and mortar shells in 2008 alone. These deliber-
ate attacks caused deaths, injuries, and extensive property damage; forced businesses to
close; and terrorized tens of thousands of residents into abandoning their homes” (The
Operation, 2009, p. 1).
Israel was widely criticised during and after the operation by neighbouring Arab states
as well as the Arab states in the Persian Gulf. For example, “Qatar actively and persis-
tently attempted to spearhead a unified Arab response to the Israeli operation in Gaza. On
January 13, 2009, in response to stagnating talks in Cairo to end the conflict, Qatar reiter-
ated its call for an Arab summit, this time in blunt and uncompromising language” (Rabi,
2009, p. 458).
Relations between Israelis and Palestinians seemed to be endangered again, after Is-
rael announced its disengagement plan in 2003.With this proposal the Israeli government
offered to disengage from the Gaza Strip and to evacuate four other settlements located in
50 Przemys³aw OSIEWICZ PP 3 ’13
the northern part of the West Bank.4 The then PrimeMinister Sharon declared in Decem-
ber 2003: “The Disengagement plan will include the redeployment of IDF forces along
new security lines and a change in the deployment of settlements, which will reduce as
much as possible the number of Israelis located in the heart of the Palestinian population.
We will draw provisional security lines and the IDF will be deployed along them. Secu-
rity will be provided by IDF deployment, the security fence and other physical obstacles.
The Disengagement Plan will reduce friction between us and the Palestinians. […] Israel
will greatly accelerate the construction of the security fence. Today we can already see it
taking shape. The rapid completion of the security fence will enable the IDF to remove
roadblocks and ease the daily lives of the Palestinian population not involved in terror”
(Israel’s, 2005, p. 23). In practice the plan resulted in a physical separation of the two na-
tional groups and isolation of Palestinians in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The
security fence has become a very controversial project.5 What is more, many analysts
claim that it actually undermined negotiations and severely restricted Palestinians.6 Yet
the Israeli side argues that “the value of the fence in saving lives is evident from the data:
In 2002, the year before construction started, 457 Israelis were murdered; in 2009, 8 Is-
raelis were killed” (Bard, 2011).
Unfortunately, the above process did not help to find a comprehensive solution and
did not bring peace to this part of the Middle East. Some scholars claim that the problems
beganwhenHamas won the parliamentary elections in the Palestinian National Authority
in January 2006 (Caridi, 2010). Nonetheless, the situation became critical after Hamas re-
tained control over Gaza in 2007. Hamas’ leaders eliminated more moderate counterparts
representing al-Fatah and sharpened their rhetoric against the state of Israel. In response,
Israel blocked the whole Gaza Strip. Officially, the Israeli authorities did it in order to
combat terrorism and protect its citizens who were suffering from almost daily rocket at-
tacks from Gaza. Unofficially, it was a part of the anti-Hamas strategy. Israelis preferred
al-Fatah representatives, because they were much more flexible during peace talks.
Moreover, Prime Minister Netanyahu angered Palestinians in January 2010 when he de-
clared publicly that several Jewish settlement blocs in the West Bank would always re-
main part of Israel. During a visit to the Etzion settlement south of Jerusalem he said: “We
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Conflict, Basingstoke; M. Sorkin (2005), Against The Wall: Israel’s Barrier to Peace, New York.
are planting here, we will stay here, we will build here. This place will be an inseparable
part of the State of Israel for eternity” (Kershner, 2010, p. 4). It sounded like the final ‘no’
to the peace negotiations. TheKing of Jordan, Abdullah II, made this point when he stated
in his recent book that the further construction of the West Bank settlements has become
the main obstacle to the peace process (Abdullah II, 2011, p. 405).
There are still many critical voices with regard to the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip. According to the Israel Supreme Court, “regrettably, the end of Israeli military rule
in the Gaza Strip did not result in a decrease in attacks launched against Israel from the
Gaza Strip, but in an increase of these attacks, both in the number of the attacks and the
range of the areas affected. Following years of rocket and mortar attacks fired from the
Gaza Strip into the territory of the State of Israel, the Israeli government decided in 2007
to limit the supply of fuel and electricity into the Gaza Strip” (Al-Bassiouni, 2009, p. 227).
In this way the Israeli authorities justify the current blockade of the Gaza Strip. The same
explanation applied to Operation Cast Lead in 2009. All in all, since 2007, the inhabitants
of the Gaza Strip have lived in very poor conditions. Their situation has been presented
and described in many reports and books (Chomsky, Pappé, 2010; Jasiewicz, 2011; Her-
mes, 2011; Roy, 2011). But is there any chance that this situation will change in the short
run? Is there still any hope for a lasting peace?
The Middle Eastern Peace Process during the Arab Awakening:
A New Opening?
Christopher Dickey claims that there are grave misgivings about the Arab awakening,
“about this new dynamic in the West. There’s the sudden and unsettling realization that
the old deals cut with Arab despots may not sit so well with the despots’ former subjects.
And yes, those despots’ peace treaties and tacit understandings with Israel could be exam-
ples. But the hoary enmity toward the Zionists is, like most other history, not especially
relevant at the moment to the Arab kids who are taking over the Arab world (unless the Is-
raelis give them reason to care anew)” (Dickey, 2012, p. 11). Nonetheless, Jörg Lau
points out that the Arab awakening has already resulted in a deepening of Israel’s isola-
tion in the Middle East (Lau, 2011, p. 5). Egypt is probably the best example. Former
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak supported good relations with Israel, but at the same
time he ignored the mainly anti-Israeli state of opinion. Anti-zionist protests also took
place in Jordan. This way Israel may lose not only its chance to improve its geopolitical
position during the Arab awakening but also lose its previous gains, e.g. friendly relations
either with Egypt or with Jordan.
In the opinion of Daniel Barenboim, “after a year of extraordinary events in the Arab
world, it is time to change perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, too. Over the
past 70 years it has been approached from many different angles, and yet all involved
have failed to grasp the nature of the conflict: it isn’t political but fundamentally human,
a conflict between two peoples who unequivocally assert their respective right to the
same piece of land” (Barenboim, 2012, p. 88). Barenboim also suggested that “while the
Palestinians have a right to resent the idea of the Israeli’s claim to what they consider their
homeland, they must now recognize the reality of Israel’s existence. The Israelis must not
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only stop the occupation and dismantle the settlements, theymust also accept responsibil-
ity for all that happened – and all that did not happen – while it lasted” (Barenboim, 2012,
p. 88). What about Palestinians? According to Gideon Levi, there are three options avail-
able to them, namely:
— unconditional surrender and further life under Israeli occupation;
— a third intifada;
— mobilisation and worldwide promotion of Palestinian statehood (2011, p. 4).
So far, the Palestinian authorities have chosen the third option. Representatives of the
Palestinian National Authority have tried to take advantage of the Arab Spring and pro-
mote the idea of Palestinian statehood. An application for UN membership, submitted in
September 2011, was the best indication of such an approach. If Palestine was accepted as
a full UN member, it would equate to its formal recognition as a sovereign state. Shir
Hever claims that such a scenario would even be profitable for Israel, because it spends
more than $6 billion on control of the occupied territories. Moreover, total settlement
subsidies reached $34 billion in 2010 (Hever, 2011, p. 13). Nevertheless, the Israeli gov-
ernment condemned the Palestinian decision and criticised the Palestinian National Au-
thority for this unilateral action. Fortunately, the Palestinians did not decide to begin
another intifada after the diplomatic failure in September 2011, although some journal-
ists, for example Edmund Sanders, had predicted such a scenario during the summer
(Sanders, 2011, pp. 4–5).
Although the two-state solution should be, at least theoretically, the best for both
sides, it is not. As far as Israel’s position is concerned, money spent on control over the
occupied territories does not seem to be a problem. Why? Because security is priceless
and any Palestinian state founded without direct negotiations would pose a threat to the
Israeli state. This time, however, the Israeli government did not have to worry about the
final outcome as it was clear that the United States would block the Palestinian initiative.
What is more, some politicians suggested taking evenmore radical steps. Tzipi Hotovely,
a member of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Likud party, stated that it was “a chance for Is-
rael to take unilateral action of its own.” In response to the Palestinians’ bid for full UN
membership, she urged the Israeli government “to start formally annexing Jewish settle-
ments in the West Bank”. She added that “it was a mistake not to extend Israeli sover-
eignty over the settlements long ago” (Ephron, 2011, p. 14).
Although the Palestinianswere not able to create their own state and become aUnitedNa-
tionsmember in September 2011, they achieved another éclat onemonth later. On 31October
the Palestinians got a seat at UNESCO. “Of 173 countries voting, 107 were in favour, 14 op-
posed and 52 abstained. In response, Washington announced it was cutting funding to
UNESCO. Its membership dues provide around a fifth of the organisation’s budget” (Pales-
tinians, 2011). Israel was against the Palestinian membership, because its government was
afraid that such decision would set a precedent. A statement issued by the Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs declared, “This decision will not turn the Palestinian Authority into an actual
state, yet places unnecessary burdens on the route to renewing negotiations. Israel believes
that the correct and onlyway tomake progress in the diplomatic process with the Palestinians
is through direct negotiations without preconditions. The Palestinian move at UNESCO, as
with similar such steps with other UN bodies, is tantamount to a rejection of the international
community’s efforts to advance the peace process” (Unesco, 2011).
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Surprisingly, Israel’s government is losing support in the United States. Although Ameri-
cans are still its most important allies, the American administration is afraid of the ex-
treme-right rhetoric of Netanyahu. Democrats called for a reassessment of the relationship
between Israel and the United States. On 19 May, 2011 Barack Obama delivered a speech
dedicated to the situation in theMiddle East andNorthAfricawhich angered both Israelis and
Palestinians. Among other things theUSPresident stated that: “For the Palestinians, efforts to
delegitimize Israel will end in failure. Symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United Nations
in September won’t create an independent state. Palestinian leaders will not achieve peace or
prosperity if Hamas insists on a path of terror and rejection. And Palestinians will never real-
ize their independence by denying the right of Israel to exist. […]As for Israel, our friendship
is rooted deeply in a shared history and shared values. Our commitment to Israel’s security is
unshakeable. And we will stand against attempts to single it out for criticism in international
forums. But precisely because of our friendship, it’s important thatwe tell the truth: The status
quo is unsustainable, and Israel too must act boldly to advance a lasting peace. […] What
America and the international community can do is to state frankly what everyone knows
– a lasting peacewill involve two states for two peoples: Israel as a Jewish state and the home-
land for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian peo-
ple, each state enjoying self-determination, mutual recognition, and peace” (2011). This
speech was heavily criticized, because Barack Obama put pressure on both sides and blamed
both for the continuing stalemate. Moreover, he suggested the best solution, namely the best
one according to the American administration and the international community.
No doubt one of the reasons for Obama’s impatience was the approach of the Israeli
government. Some of Benjamin Netanyahu’s ideas could be devastating not only for the
Middle East, but also for the United States, especially if the Israeli Prime Minister de-
cided to attack selected targets in Iran without Washington’s permission. Yet Benjamin
Netanyahu can count on Republicans. No doubt the present Israeli government would
like to see a Republican candidate replacing Barack Obama after the US presidential elec-
tions in 2016. According to Fania Oz-Salzberger, “the new generation of pro-Israeli
Republican hopefuls is dwarfing its predecessors with a pungent mix of messianic Chris-
tianity and a misplaced love of Zion. It feels like Rick Perry and Michele Bachmann are
competing to win the prize for more-Israeli-than-thou” (Oz-Salzberger, 2011, p. 11).
Rick Perry was said to say that “a Republican Christian is better than the Moslem cur-
rently inhabiting the White House” (Oz-Salzberger, 2011, p. 11).
Besides, Israel should take into consideration its relations with Turkey, which is not an
Arab state, but one with steadily growing economic, as well as political influence in the Arab
world. It should be emphasised that Turkey tried to mediate indirect talks between Syria and
Israel. TheUnited States supported Turkish-Israeli cooperation as it safeguarded its influence
in theMiddle East. Nevertheless, everything changed after the operation inGaza. “Already at
the Davos Summit in 2009, PrimeMinister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan stunned the international
community by standing up and expressing his vocal and direct criticism of Israel’s unilateral
Palestine policy before the world public opinion” (Özhan, 2010, p. 10).7 Undoubtedly, the
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Gaza Flotilla Crisis of May 2010 became another turning point in the history of Turk-
ish-Israeli relations (Bayoumi, 2010; Copeland et al, 2011). The Turkish Prime Minister
also became a national hero in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, during the Arab awakening
“Erdoðan portrayed himself as a neo-Ottoman savior. […] Many Israelis view him as
a mortal enemy of their country” (Matthews, 2011, pp. 8–9). Obviously, the Turkish
PrimeMinister realised that Turkey could gain more by moving closer to the Palestinians
and the Arab states at the expense of Israel. The more anti-Israeli it is, the more popular it
becomes in the Middle East. Of course, Turkey cannot cut its ties with Israel completely,
due to the political pressure from the United States, as well as their bilateral military co-
operation; however, the Israeli authorities should be prepared for even that scenario
which would undermine the Middle East peace process completely.
Another question is whether Israelis and Arabs can find a solution themselves or
whether they the need help or mediation of a third party, like the United Nations. On the
one hand, the Palestinians opt for mediation, because their political position is weak in
comparison with the Israelis. On the other hand, if the UN were to take control of the
whole peace process, any solution would not be favourable to Israel, as many UN mem-
ber states support the Palestinian side officially or unofficially. The 2011 voting in
UNESCO, or the upgrade of Palestinian status in the UN General Assembly of 2012, are
probably the best examples.
Finally, growing tensions between Israel and Iran do not create a good atmosphere for
any peace dialogue. Israel opposes the Iranian nuclear program and has threatened to
bomb its nuclear installations, unless Iran puts an end to further scientific research. It
would be an enormousmilitary effort for Israel, to say nothing of creating potential politi-
cal and economic costs. Besides, such a scenario would have very serious regional and
global implications, as Iran could block the Strait of Hormuz, contributing to further in-
creases in oil prices, or attack selected targets in Israel.8 At the same time, Iran is said to
support Hamas in the Gaza Strip as well as Hezbollah in South Lebanon. Obviously, such
declarations as well as actions will constitute obstacles to theMiddle East peace process.
Conclusions
The Arab-Israeli conflict, especially as far as relations between Israelis and Palestin-
ians are concerned, seems to be a never-ending story. All the available options have been
on the table for years, but so far it has not resulted in any comprehensive and lasting
agreement. Undoubtedly, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are satisfied with status
quo. Both sides claim that the two-state solution would suit them best, however the main
difference between them lies in the possible ways of achieving this goal. The Israeli set-
tlements in the West Bank seem to be the main obstacle to the current peace process. Yet
this case is hopeless. On the one hand, the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu is
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not going to make any concessions. On the other hand, the Palestinians will not make any
serious territorial concessions to the Israeli side. Moreover, the Israeli side is demanding
direct talks without preconditions, a demand that was repeated during the Israeli-Pa-
lestinian meeting in Jordan in January 2012 (Bronner, 2012, p. 5).
The Arab-Israeli conflict has its own dynamism. Undoubtedly, the Arab-Israeli con-
flict is still being analysed by numerous politicians and scholars, but only a few of them
can predict what may happen there next year or even next month. The longer the conflict
lasts, the more difficult it will be to find a mutually advantageous solution. The Arab
awakeningmight give a new boost to the peace process in theMiddle East, but at the same
time it might contribute to its complete failure. The future policies of Egypt and Syria
seem to be a key issue. Yet it is hard to predict what will happen in those states.
Finally, it is becoming noticeable that Israel is getting more and more isolated. The Is-
raeli government is losing support in the United States and its good relations with Turkey.
It is not even clear if Israel is managing to maintain its hitherto prevailing friendly rela-
tions with Egypt or Jordan. Soon, Israelis may not have any other option but to accept
a disadvantageous agreement. All in all, 2012 may become a turning point in the Middle
East peace process.
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Streszczenie
Bliskowschodni proces pokojowy. W stronê kolejnego impasu?
Konflikt bliskowschodni pozostaje jedn¹ z najwa¿niejszych kwestii w stosunkach miêdzynarodo-
wych po II wojnie œwiatowej. Jedn¹ z najwa¿niejszych wyzwañ jest okreœlenie czy bliskowschodni pro-
ces pokojowy jest zwi¹zany z szeroko pojmowanym konfliktem bliskowschodnim czy te¿, ujmuj¹c
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rzecz precyzyjniej, z konfliktem arabsko-izraelskim. W kontekœcie kontroli nad terytorium mo¿na wy-
ró¿niæ dwa mo¿liwe scenariusze. Po pierwsze, Palestyñczycy ¿yj¹cy pod zarz¹dem izraelskim. Po dru-
gie, rozwi¹zanie na bazie utworzenia dwóch niepodleg³ych pañstw, czyli uznanie pañstwa Izrael przez
wszystkie pañstwa arabskie w zamian za zgodê na utworzenie pañstwa palestyñskiego. Dotychczas
przedstawionowiele planów uregulowania tego problemu, na przyk³ad, podczas negocjacji pokojowych
w Oslo, spotkania w Tabie w 2001 roku czy te¿ konferencji w Annapolis w 2007. Jednak ¿aden z nich
nie doprowadzi³ do przyjêcia ca³oœciowego rozwi¹zania konfliktu. Pojawia siê pytanie czy spo³ecznoœæ
miêdzynarodowa bêdzie musia³a pogodziæ siê z kolejnym impasem w ramach bliskowschodniego pro-
cesu pokojowego. A mo¿e tak zwane arabskie przebudzenie, czyli trwaj¹ce procesy zmian spo³ecz-
no-politycznych w pañstwach arabskich, doprowadz¹ do zmiany sytuacji w regionie i umo¿liwi¹
zawarcie porozumienia?
S³owa kluczowe: Izrael, Palestyna, proces pokojowy, konflikt arabsko-izraelski, negocjacje
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